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I. Introduction
China's largest Internet companies are tuming to the U.S. stock exchange to
raise financial capital for expansion.' A company raises financial capital by sell-
ing shares of ownership of their company to investors on a stock exchange. 2
Typically, an investor buys shares and receives a piece of equity ownership in the
company. 3 However, this is not the case for over half of the companies domiciled
in the People's Republic of China ("PRC") that are listed on the U.S. stock ex-
change.4 The PRC government restricts Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI") in
* J.D. Candidate, Loyola Chicago School of Law, expected May 2016; B.A., Business Adminis-
tration, University of Washington, 2006.
I U.S.-CHINA EcON. & SECURITY REv. COMMISSION STAFF REP., THE RISKS OF CHINA'S INTERNET
COMPANIES ON U.S. STOCK EXCHANGEs 2 (Kevin Rosier, June 18, 2014).
2 See, e.g., Equity Market, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equitymarket
.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (Equity market, "[ailso known as the stock market, . . . gives companies
access to capital and investors a slice of ownership in the company."); Stock Exchange, MERRIAM-WEB-
STER, http://www.meniam-webster.com/dictionary/stock%20exchange (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (de-
fining stock exchange as "a system or place where shares of various companies are bought and sold").
3 See, e.g,. Marty Schmidt, Equity: Owner's Equity, Net Worth, and Book Value Explained, BuIJIL-
ING Bus. CASE (Jan. 10, 2015), https://www.business-case-analysis.com/owners-equity.html.
4 Paul Gillis, Statistics on VIE Usage, CHINA Accr. BLoc (Apr. 11, 2011, 7:20 PM), www.chinaac-
countingblog.com/weblog/statistics-on-vie-usage.html ("42% of U.S. listed Chinese companies use the
VIE structure."); see also Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success and the
Legal Risks Involved, CADWALADER (Aug. 10, 2011) http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-
friends-memos/understanding-the-vie-structure-necessary-elements-for-success-and-the-legal-risks-in-
volved ("As of April 2011, forty-two percent of Chinese companies listed in the United States have used
the VIE.").
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many of its economic sectors.5 To work around these restrictions, China's In-
ternet companies utilize a complicated and highly risky investment method
known as a Variable Interest Entity ("VIE").6
In recent years, more than one hundred Chinese companies have adopted the
VIE structure for their offshore listings to bypass PRC government restrictions.7
Like many Chinese companies, China's e-commerce Internet giant, Alibaba,
adopted the VIE structure to list on the U.S. stock exchange and circumvent PRC
laws pertaining to foreign investments.8 In September 2014, Alibaba became the
largest initial public offering ("IPO") in U.S. history.9 As Alibaba becomes sy-
nonymous with "Chinese Amazon," unsuspecting U.S. investors will continue to
buy into Alibaba's precarious VIE structure and potentially expose themselves to
great risk.10
Part II of this article discusses China's economic history that gave rise to the
VIE structure as a regulatory loophole to PRC restrictions. China's FDI policy
drastically changed under Deng Xiaoping's rule when he initiated economic re-
form with the Open-Door Policy to encourage foreign investment in China. De-
spite FDI encouragement, numerous restrictions remained to protect sensitive
industries, including the Internet sector. To circumvent these restrictions, Chinese
e-commerce giant Alibaba adopted the VIE structure. While VIEs currently per-
mit FDI, the validity of the VIE structure under PRC law remains ambiguous.
Part III of this article examines the regulatory environments in which VIEs
operate. Specifically, this section will discuss the modifications to PRC regula-
tions over the years, highlighting blatant regulatory warnings against investment
practices that are designed to avoid PRC regulatory scrutiny. PRC regulations
and laws govern the contractual relationships on which foreign investors heavily
rely in the VIE structure. An investor's understanding of China's regulatory envi-
ronment is important to fully comprehend the potential risks they face. In the
U.S., the Security Exchange Commission ("SEC") has taken limited action in
providing ample disclosure of the potential risks involved when investing in
VIEs.
5 Neil Gough, In China, Concern about a Chill on Foreign Investments, N.Y. TIMEs (June 2, 2013,
2:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/201 3/06/02/in-china-concem-of-a-chilI-on-foreign-investments/
? r-0.
6 COMMIssioN STAFF RErORT, supra note 1.
7 Zeng Xianwu & Bai Lihui, Variable Interest Entity Structure in China, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Feb. 9,
2012), http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2012/02/articles/corporate/foreign-investment/variable-interest-
entity-structure-in-chinal.
8 Charles Clover, Alibaba IPO shows Foreign Investors Able to Skirt Restrictions, FIN. TIMEs (May
7, 2014, 2:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7a8c4816-d5df-I le3-aO17-00144feabdcO.html#axzz3
OaRsL9dL.
9 Elzio Barreto, Alibaba IPO Ranks as World's Biggest After Additional Shares Sold, RIUTERS
(Sept. 22, 2014, 12:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-alibaba-ipo-value-idUSKCNO
HHOA620140922; see also EcoN. TIMiis, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/IPO, (defining
IPO as "initial public offering or IPO is the first sale of stock by a company to the public").
10 See Benjamin Pimentel, Alibaba IPO Faces This U.S. Hurdle: What Is It?, MARKIr WATCH (May
5, 2014, 5:56 PM), http://marketwatch.com/story/alibaba-ipo-sparksexcitment-caution-2014-05-05/.
250 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 12, Issue 2
Alibaba's Regulatory Work-Around to China's Foreign Investment Restrictions
Part IV evaluates the risks foreign investors face when investing in a VIE.
There are two types of legal risks inherent in the Alibaba VIE structure and
furthermore, there is limited legal recourse available to foreign investors. First,
foreign investors must assess the possibility of the PRC government declaring the
VIE structure illegal. Second, foreign investors must consider the risk of underly-
ing contracts being deemed unenforceable under PRC law. In either instance,
U.S. investors will have limited recourse available under current law if they lose
control over investment rights in the VIE structure. Furthermore, China recently
proposed a Foreign Investment Law ("FL") that will significantly impact foreign
investment practices in China. While the new proposed law aims to solve issues
inherit to the VIE structure, the ultimate validity of established VIE entities, such
as Alibaba, remains uncertain.
Part V recommends supplementary actions that may help resolve the funda-
mental problems of the VIE structure and FDI practices in China. VIEs are cur-
rently the only reasonable mechanism to bring foreign investment into China's
Internet sector. In an attempt to reduce the risk U.S. investors face when invest-
ing in VIEs, the U.S. must engage China to remedy the issues surrounding FDI
so that China's Internet industry, and ultimately the Chinese economy, may con-
tinue to grow. Moreover, it is not the VIEs themselves, but rather the unclear
Chinese government policies that are the true source of the problem. Despite
China's recent steps to clarify FDI policies under the proposed FIL, the law lacks
clear guidelines for the treatment of existing VIE structure under Chinese law.
While FL is pending further revisions, VIE entities, like Alibaba, should begin
to prepare for the legislature's ultimate decision and final approval, and any sub-
sequent effects that may impact their business structures. Once enacted, the pro-
posed law will radically change China's foreign investment landscape.
II. Variable Interest Entities in China
A. History of Foreign Investments Restrictions
Since 1949, the PRC has operated under the unitary rule of the Chinese Com-
munist Party ("CCP").II Mao Zedong, chairman of the CCP, strived to achieve a
"socialist market economy" during his rule from 1949-1978.12 During the
Maoist-era, China maintained self-sufficiency in the country's trade and com-
merce and FDI was practically non-existent in the Chinese economy. 1 3 After the
demise of Mao, trade barriers were removed and this change became a key factor
I I See Daniel Chang, Modernization of the Chinese Legal System: A Brief Historical Review, N.Z.
CHINA TRADE Ass'N, http://www.nzcta.co.nz/chinanow-commentary/1517/modernization-of-the-chinese-
legal-system-a-brief-historical-review/#sthash.mjn6Em5Z.dpuf (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
12 Vivienne Bath, Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security - Foreign Direct
Investment in Australia and China, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 6 (2012) ("China is a one-party unitary state
aiming to develop a 'socialist market economy.'").
13 See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and Implications for International Tax
Debates, FLA. TAX REV. 669, 670 ("China had no foreign direct investment ("FDI") before 1979.").
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in the modernization of the PRC under the rule of Deng Xiaoping.' 4 In 1978,
Deng Xiaoping led the PRC in economic reform, implementing the groundbreak-
ing Open-Door Policy.' 5 The new policy encouraged foreign resources, welcom-
ing FDI to spur economic growth in China.16
Despite the progressive policy changes implemented under Xiaoping's rule,
protectionism continued to persist in the form of restrictions on foreign invest-
ments in specific industries.' 7
FDI guidelines and restrictions are specified in the Catalogue for the Guidance
of Foreign Investments Industries ("Catalogue").' The Catalogue classifies in-
dustry sectors into three categories, designating foreign investment as "en-
couraged," "restricted" or "prohibited" for each respective industry.1 9 Foreign
investments are "permitted" in those industries not expressly noted in the Cata-
logue.20 Conversely, foreign investors are not permitted to invest in "prohibited"
industries under any circumstance. 2 1 The prohibited industry sectors are typically
those deemed by the Chinese government to be strategic and emerging industries,
or otherwise those industries that are sensitive for political or national security
reasons. 22 The Internet sector, where the VIE structure is prevalently used, is
categorized as prohibited, disallowing foreign investments and forbidding foreign
ownership in PRC-domiciled companies. 2 3
B. Variable Interest Entities
VIE is an investment structure used by many Chinese companies and foreign
investors to bypass Chinese government restrictions on FDI.2 4 The VIE structure
14 WAYNE M. MORRISON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33534, CHINA'S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS I n.I,
2-3.
15 Shigeo Kobayashi et al., The "Three Reforms" in China: Progress and Outlook, 45 RIM (Sept.
1999), http://www.jri.co.jp/english/periodical/rim/1999/RIMel99904threereforms/.
16 William 1. Friedman, One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict Between China's Commu-
nist Politics and Capitalist Securities Market, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 478 (2002) ("Deng Xiaoping
. . . adopted an 'open door' policy, centering on economic reforms utilizing market mechanisms and
foreign resources to speed up the growth and modernization of the economy.").
17 See Shen Wei, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba? -Placing (or Misplacing)
Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 H.K.L.J. 275, 275 (2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2320402 ("Recent years witnessed a rising chorus of com-
plaints from the foreign business community concerning China's protectionist regulatory environment
and increasing hostility to foreign multinationals.").
18 Jane Bu et al., China's New Foreign Investment Catalogue Comes into Effect, MoRRISoN FOERS-
TER I (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/120130-Foreign-Invest-
ment-Catalogue.pdf.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Xianwu & Lihui, supra note 7.
22 COMMISSIoN STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
23 See Sue-Lin Wong, China Court Ruling Could Threaten Foreign Investments in Country, N.Y.
TIMEs (June 17, 2013, 3:09 AM), http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/china-court-ruling-
could-threaten-some-foreign-invested-companies/?_php=true-type=blogs-r-0.
24 COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 1.
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is commonly referred to as the Sina-model structure. 25 Sina Corporation was the
first PRC-domiciled company to acquire an offshore public listing through a VIE
structure in 2000.26 Since then, foreign investors have replicated the VIE struc-
ture in a variety of sectors in China's economy where FDI is either restricted or
prohibited under PRC law. 2 7
In its most basic form, a VIE is comprised of three entities: an offshore hold-
ing company that is listed on the U.S. exchange, a Wholly Foreign-Owned Entity
("WOFE") domiciled in the PRC and an operating business entity domiciled in
the PRC.2 8 A U.S. investor purchases shares in the offshore holding company,
which is usually based in an offshore tax haven such as the Cayman Islands. 2 9
The offshore holding company owns one hundred percent of the PRC-domiciled
WFOE.30 In effect, the offshore holding company links foreign investors to the
operating PRC-domiciled company through complex legal contracts set up by the
WFOE.3 1 These contractual agreements mimic equity ownership, however do not
bestow actual equity ownership in the operating company. 32 Operating control
remains within the PRC-domiciled company, presumably to comply with Chi-
nese laws while foreign investors derive economic benefits solely from the con-
tractual agreements. 33
U.S. investors face major risks from the complexity of the VIE structure and
the rudimentary regulatory environment in China.34 The legal contracts that serve
as the basis of the VIE structure are only enforceable in China, where rule of law
remains undeveloped. 35 Thus, to an investor, a VIE investment is only as good as
the validity of its underlying contractual agreements. 36 These contracts are only
binding and enforceable if Chinese courts are willing to uphold them.3 7 While
25 Xianwu & Lihui, supra note 7.
26 Id.
27 See id.
28 David Roberts & Thomas Hall, VIE Structures in China: What You Need to Know, Torics CHI-
NESE L. 1-2 (Oct. 2011), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6963/rfCL_-_VIEStructures-in_
China.pdf (analyzing the components of a basic VIE structure).
29 Dune Lawrence, China Companies Evading Owner Rule with US Listings Frustrate Regulators,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-09/china-companies-
evading-rule-with-u-s-listings-stump-regulators.html.
30 Dan Harris, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy, CHINA L. BioG (Oct. 10, 2011), http://
www.chinalawblog.com/201 1/10/vies in china the end of a_flawedstrategy.html.
31 See id.; Lawrence, supra note 29.
32 See Lawrence, supra note 29.
33 Id.; see also Harris, supra note 30.
34 See Steven Davidoff, Alibaba Investors Will Buy a Risky Corporate Structure, N.Y. TIMEs (May 6,
2014, 7:46 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/i-p-o-revives-debate-over-a-chinese-structure/
? r-0.
35 Id.
36 Dan Harris, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Fraud. Clear Speaking On VIEs, CHINA L. BLOG (July 16,
2011), http://www.chinalawblog.com/2011/07/crouching-tiger-hidden-fraudclear.speaking-onvies
.html.
37 Paul Gillis, Variable Interest Entites in China, FORENSIc AsIA, (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www
.chinaaccountingblog.com/vie-2012septaccountingmatte.pdf.
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listing a company under a VIE structure on the U.S. exchanges is legal in the
United States, they can still be considered illegal in China.38 PRC authorities
have yet to formally confirm the validity of the existing VIE structure under PRC
law, leaving foreign investors' funds at risk. 3 9
C. Alibaba: China's Internet Giant
Alibaba is China's largest online commerce company, hosting hundreds of
millions of users and a wide variety of merchants and businesses. 40 Alibaba
founder and CEO, Jack Ma, started Alibaba.com out of his apartment in 1999.41
Today, Alibaba is in the world's fastest growing e-commerce market, handling
more business than any other e-commerce company. 42 Last year, the value of all
merchandise sold on Alibaba's online sites exceeded $248 billion, more than the
volume on eBay and Amazon combined.4 3
Foreign investors flocked to purchase Alibaba stock in their recent IPO on the
New York Stock Exchange to raise over $25 billion dollars, making it the largest
IPO in U.S. history. 4 Like other Chinese Internet companies, Alibaba utilized
the VIE structure to avoid PRC government restrictions.4 5 Consequently,
Alibaba's stock carries similar risks to other VIE-structured companies. 46
Alibaba's SEC Form F-I filing explicitly describes the legal ambiguity of it's
VIE structure and the related risks. 4 7 A section entitled "Risks Related to Our
Corporate Structure" bluntly forewarns foreign investors:
If the PRC government deems that the contractual arrangements in rela-
tion to our variable interest entities do not comply with PRC governmen-
tal restrictions on foreign investment, or if these regulations or the
interpretation of existing regulations changes in the future, we could be
subject to penalties or be forced to relinquish our interest in those
operations. 48
38 See generally id.
39 Xianwu & Lihui, supra note 7.
40 Marc Lajoie & Nick Sherman, What is Alibaba?, WALL STREIrr J., http://projects.wsj.com/alibabal
(last visited Feb. 14, 2015).
41 Jillian D'Onfro, How Jack Ma Went from Being a Poor School Teacher to Turning Alibaba into a
$160 Billion Behemoth, Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2014, 3:12 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-
story-of-jack-ma-founder-of-alibaba-2014-9.
42 Lajoie & Sherman, supra note 40.
43 Id.; see also Vindu Goel et al., Chinese Giant Alibaba Will Go Public, Listing in U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2014, 4:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/ 06/alibaba-files-to-go-public-in-the-u-s.
44 Leslie Picker & Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba's Banks Boost IPO Size to Record of $25 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2014 8:05 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-22/alibaba-s-banks-
said-to-increase-ipo-size-to-record-25-billion.html.
45 Clover, supra note 8.
46 Gregory J. Millman, Alibaba's IPO Puts VIE Structure in the Spotlight, WALL STRIEr J. (Sept. 22,
2014, 9:46 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/09/22/alibabas-ipo-puts-vie-structure-in-
the-spotlight/.
47 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) 47 (Sept. 15, 2014).
48 Id. at 48.
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In addition to a risky corporate structure, Alibaba uses a preferential stock
structure that establishes all decision-making authority with the company's foun-
ders in China.4 9 Under this particular stock structure, owning shares of the com-
pany does not equate to voting rights.50 According to Alibaba's SEC filing, the
preferential stock structure limits foreign investors' "ability to influence corpo-
rate matters, including any matters to be at the board of directors level." 5
A recent controversy between Alibaba and its first major foreign investor, Ya-
hoo, sheds further light on the risks U.S. investors face in buying into Chinese
Internet companies under the VIE structure.52 Yahoo, an American Internet com-
pany, became one of Alibaba's largest foreign investors back in 2005 purchasing
roughly a 40% stake in the offshore holding company.53 Through the VIE ar-
rangement, Alibaba's offshore holding company developed Alipay, a Chinese
payment-service similar to PayPal. 54 The payment service tool was expected to
be a prosperous opportunity for Yahoo as a major investor and shareholder in
Alibaba.5 5 However, despite being a recognized board member, Yahoo did not
have a say in Alibaba's recent decision to split Alipay into a separate entity
controlled by solely by Jack Ma. 56
Jack Ma made the bold, unilateral decision to terminate Alipay's VIE and
transfer 70% equity of Alipay from the offshore holding company into a separate
entity domiciled in China.57 Ma defends this controversial decision as a neces-
sary move in order for Alipay to acquire a proper operational license from the
People's Bank of China.58 The People's Bank of China requires that all payment
service companies in the country obtain a license to operate. 59 Furthermore, the
central bank limited license eligibility only to local entities, leaving rules pertain-
ing to foreign invested-companies ambiguous. 60 Yahoo's foreign ownership in
Alipay posed an issue on the company's ability to obtain the govemment-man-
49 COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
50 Id.; see generally Alibaba's IPO is Nothing to Celebrate, BlOOMBERGVIFw (Mar. 18, 2014, 3:23
PM), http://bloombergview.com/articles/2014-03-18/alibaba-s-ipo-is-nothing-to-celebrate.
51 Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., supra note 47.
52 COMMISSION STAFI REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
53 Andrea Peterson, An Alibaba IPO Means Lots of Cash for Yahoo to Spend on More Acquisition,
WASH. . POST (May 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/05/07/an-
alibaba-ipo-means-lots-of-cash-for-yahoo-to-spend-on-more-acquisitions/.
54 See generally Loretta Chao, Alipay Receives China License, WALL STREET J. (May 27, 2011,
12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304066504576347212434217054?autolog
in=ymg=id-wsj.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structure for Foreign Investment in the PRC May Face Challenges,
KING & WooD MALLESONS (Nov. 2001), http://www.kingandwood.com/article.aspx?id=china-bulletin-
2011-11-02; see also Steven Millward, Tough-Talking Jack Ma Admits Acting Unilaterally in Alipay
Controversy, TECHINASIA (July 7, 2011, 2:15 PM), https://www.techinasia.com/jack-ma-alipay/.
58 Millward, supra note 57.
59 Chao, supra note 54.
60 Id.
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dated online payment license. 6 1 However, Yahoo claims that it was not aware of
the transfer for more than six months after the transaction was completed. 62
After months of dispute, Alibaba and Yahoo announced that they settled the
disagreement. 63 While the agreement reached allows Yahoo to share in the future
gain of Alipay, analysts are not convinced the settlement is enough to compen-
sate Yahoo for the loss of Alipay's value to the Alibaba portfolio.64
This recent controversy shows the potential risks foreign investors, such as
Yahoo, face by investing in a VIE. 6 5 The VIE arrangement and preferential stock
structure made Alipay's undisclosed transfer possible, leaving Yahoo in the dark
about a key business decision. 66 Beyond the risks within the company structure,
foreign investors must rely on China's judicial system to enforce the contractual
agreements which are the foundation of the VIE structure. 67 The CCP-controlled
judicial system combined with China's unreliable regulatory environment poses
even greater risks when foreign investors seek to secure their rights in disputes
with Chinese entities. 68
III. Regulatory Environment
A. China's Regulatory Environment
Alibaba expressly acknowledges in its SEC filings "there are substantial un-
certainties regarding the interpretation and application of the current and future
PRC laws, rules, and regulations." 6 9 The PRC government has never formally
confirmed the validity of the VIE structure under PRC law.7 0 Moreover, a series
of regulatory decisions over the years have left the validity of the VIE structure
in question.7 '
Prior to the introduction of the VIE structure, China Unicom introduced an-
other work-around joint venture - China-China Foreign Structure ("CCF struc-
ture") - in 1994 to circumvent FDI restrictions. 72 Four years later, the CCF
61 Millward, supra note 57.
62 Chao, supra note 54.
63 Understanding the VIE Structure: Necessary Elements for Success and the Legal Risks Involved,
CADWALADER (Aug. 10, 2011) http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/understand-
ing-the-vie-structure-necessary-elements-for-success-and-the-legal-risks-involved.
64 Id.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See Gillis, supra note 37.
68 See generally Understanding the VIE Structure, supra note 4.
69 Solomon, supra note 34.
70 Xianwu & Lihui, supra note 7.
71 Id.
72 MOFCOM's New Security Review Measures (Announcement No. 53), CADWALADER, WICKER-
SHAM & TAFr LLP at 2; see also Gordon G. Chang, China Can Expropriate Alibaba's Business - And It
Just Might, FORBEs (May 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/05/11 /china-can-ex-
propriate-alibabas-business-and-it-just-might/.
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structure was declared illegal by the Chinese government. 73 Unicorn was forced
to dissolve their corporate structure, triggering unfavorable consequences for
Unicorn's ejected foreign investors.74 A similar situation could unfold for more
foreign investors as FDI work-around structures continue to be monitored
closely. 75
Recent PRC regulations have increased both in the number and the complexity
of requirements imposed on foreign investors looking to acquire enterprises or
assets in China.76 These new regulations raise questions regarding the validity of
the VIE structure used by Chinese companies looking to evade FDI restrictions. 7 7
In 2011, the State Counsel, PRC's highest administrative body, issued the No-
tice on Establishing a Security Review System for Acquisition of Domestic En-
terprises by Foreign Investors ("Circular 6").78 Circular 6 established an
extensive government review process for foreign investors and Chinese compa-
nies that are susceptible to control of a non-PRC investor. 7 9
To help implement Circular 6, China's Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM")
promulgated Measures on the Security Review System of Foreign Investors
Merging and Acquiring Domestic Enterprises, Announcement No. 53 (the "M&A
Rules").8 0 MOFCOM is responsible for formulating policy on foreign trade, ex-
port and import regulations, consumer protection, as well as foreign direct invest-
ments.8 1 Of particular importance to the VIE structure, Article 9 of the M&A
Rules reads:
With regard to the merger and acquisition of domestic enterprises under-
taken by foreign investors, the authorities should judge whether such
transaction is subject to the security review based on the essential content
and actual impact of the transaction. Foreign investors shall not avoid
M&A security review through any means, including but not limited to
commissioned shareholdings, trusts, multi-level investments, leases,
loans, contractual control, and overseas transactions. 82
73 Chang, China Can Expropriate Alibaba's Business - And It Just Might, FORBES (May 11, 2014).
74 Id. at 1.
75 Id.
76 Cadwalader, supra note 63, at 2.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Robert Lewis, Investors at the Gate, 26 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 36, 36 (2007) (noting the "spectacular
and well-publicized demise" of the CCF structure); Leontine D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China's
Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the Rule of Laws and Foreign Investment in China, 20 NW.
J. INT'L. L. & BUS. 509, 510 (1999) (calling the birth, development, and demise of the CCF structure an
ill-fated and a perfect example of the lack of clarity in the PRC's investment law).
80 Cadwalader, supra note 63, at 2.
81 Ministry of Commerce Peoples Republic of China, Mission Statement, MOFCOM (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/column/mission200.shtml.
82 Announcement No. 53 of 2011 of MOFCOM Concerning the Provisions of the MOFCOM for the
Implementation of the Security Review System for M&A of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by the Min. of Com., Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept. 1, 2011) (China), available at http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/sys/print.shtml?/policyrelease/aaa/201 112/20111207869355.
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Arguably, the VIE structure is subject to foreign investors obtaining "actual
control" of the PRC-domiciled company by engaging in "overseas transactions"
and exercising "contractual control." 83 The PRC government, as a result, is free
to interpret the M&A Rules as a clear indication that the VIE structure is de-
signed to avoid the PRC regulatory restrictions.8 4 Consequently, many people
question how much longer the VIE structure can survive under these new regula-
tions, which appear to target these types of investment structures.85 The vague
wording of the rules could give PRC regulators greater discretionary powers
when determining the validity and legality of VIEs.8 6 In 2013, the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court of China, China's top judicial body, ruled that contractual agreements
in VIE arrangements were clearly intended to circumvent Chinese regulations
and were equivalent to "concealing illegal intention with a lawful form."8 7
Foreign investment policy will continue to change as the VIE structure gains
traction as China's economy continues to grow and more FDI restricted indus-
tries seek financial capital.88 According to MOFCOM spokesman Shen Dayang,
MOFCOM is considering new rules for VIEs.89 Dayang acknowledged the ab-
sences of current laws or regulations in place to regulate VIEs, and stated that
MOFCOM and other related government agencies are studying ways to regulate
such investments.90
B. Role of the SEC in Regulating VIEs Listed in the US
U.S. regulatory authority on VIE structures and their validity is limited to
warning investors of the potential risks.9 1 All publicly-held companies in the
U.S., including VIEs, are subject to the regulation of the SEC. 9 2 The SEC was
83 Gough, supra note 5.
84 Id.
85 See Steve Dickinson, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy, CHINA L. BLOG (Oct. 10,
2011), available at http://www.chinalawblog.com/201 1/10/vies in china the end of a_flawed-strategy
.html (stating that the contractual arrangements on which the various VIEs are based are in clear violation
of Chinese law).
86 Kathrin Hille, Foreign Internet Presence in China to Face Scrutiny, FIN. TIMus (Sept. 1, 2011,
5:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/7f8645e2-d493-1 IeO-a42b-00144feab49a.html#axzzlWb8B6c
eg (noting that the vague wording of the rules could give regulators greater discretionary powers).
87 Gough, supra note 5.
88 Roberts & Hall, supra note 28, at 7.
89 Lawrence, supra note 29.
90 Id.
91 See generally The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integ-
rity, and Facilitates Capital Formation' U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml#intro; Thomas B. Hatch et al., China's Forbidden Investment: Emerging Legal Risks for
Investors Who Deal with Chinese Variable Interest Entity (VIE) Structures, RoINS, KAPLAN, MILLER &
CIRESI LLP (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.rkmc.com/resources/articles/china-s-forbidden-investment
(describing the claim in the Orient Paper lawsuit that while the VIE contractual arrangement is disclosed
in the Form 10-K filing, the disclosure was so buried that it did not adequately inform the shareholders).
92 See US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), DELOfffE, http://www.iasplus.comlen/re-
sources/regional/sec (last visited Jan. 2, 2015), (discussing the role of the SEC, quoting "In the United
States, the public capital markets are regulated primarily by the US Securities and Exchange Commission
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created in the wake of the Great Depression and adopted the core mission of
protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets and facilitat-
ing capital formation. 9 3 The SEC also carries the responsibility of informing the
public about investments via corporate disclosure.94
The risks of investing in VIEs are described in detail in SEC filings.9 5 Compa-
nies are required to disclose all material information in periodic filings with the
SEC. 96 Information is considered material if there is a "substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made availa-
ble." 97 Risk factors are considered material and are typically disclosed under the
section "risk factors" in the SEC filing. 98 However, disclosure of risk may still be
considered inadequate for investor awareness in the complex and substantial risks
pertaining to VIEs.99
The VIE structure poses controversial issues, and the SEC must sufficiently
investigate companies such as Alibaba to ensure proper disclosure and compli-
ance with securities regulations. 00 On the eve of the Alibaba IPO, US Senator
Bob Casey, urged the SEC to look further into the risks of companies using the
same VIE structure as Alibaba.' 0 1 In his letter to the SEC, Casey called upon the
SEC to redouble its efforts to investigate companies using the VIE structure.' 0 2
Alibaba revealed its correspondence with the SEC after the IPO.103 The federal
regulators focused on questions pertaining to Alibaba's ownership structure and
affiliations with outside companies.104 Overall, the SEC asked eighty-six ques-
93 See Paul S. Atkins & Bradley J. Bondi, Evaluating the Mission: A Critical Review of the History
and Evolution of the SEC Enforcement Program, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 368 (2008).
94 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) (identifying the disclosure requirement as one of the two basic component of
the US securities law); see also The Investor's Advocate, supra note 91, at 1 (explaining that the SEC
"requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public" in order
to make sure that "all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have access to
certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it").
95 Gillis, supra note 37.
96 Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of Material, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
5, 2011, 5:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-
of-materiall (explaining that public companies in the United States must periodically file reports disclos-
ing all material information with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
97 Id.
98 Steve Dickinson, VIEs in China. The End of a Flawed Strategy., CHINA L. BI.OG (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://www.chinalawblog.com/201 1/10/vies-in china the end of_ aflawedstrategy.html.
99 Hatch et al., supra note 91 (describing a situation where the VIE contractual arrangement is dis-
closed in the Form 10-K filing, but the disclosure was so buried that it did not adequately inform the
shareholders).
100 Michael J. De La Merced, On Eve of Alibaba's I.P.O., Senator Urges S.E.C. to Look at Risks in
Some Chinese Offerings, NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 17, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/
on-eve-of-alibabas-i-p-o-senator-urges-s-e-c-to-look-at-risks-in-some-chinese-offerings/.
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102 Id.
103 Telis Demos, Five Questions SEC Posed to Alibaba, WALL STREEf JOURNAL (Oct. 17, 2014),
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tions to Alibaba in its first round of examinations, twice the number of questions
that a typical U.S. IPO received in 2013.105
The SEC could further improve corporate filing disclosures to fulfill its mis-
sion of helping the investing public to make informed investment decisions. 06
However, that may not be enough to adequately protect foreign investors from
the major risks based in the complexity and purpose of the VIE structure, as
acknowledged by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(the "Commission"). 0 7 The U.S. Congress created the Commission to study the
national security implications of our economic relationship with China.' 0 8 The
Commission suggests that if the VIE system collapse and Chinese shareholders
choose not to honor the VIE contractual agreements the consequences could re-
sult in a multi-billion dollar loss to U.S. investors.1 09 To combat the possible
damage, the SEC should engage in investigative work on the ground in China so
it is better able to inform and educate U.S. investors of the risks involved with
the VIE structure." 0
IV. VIE Risk Assessment
A. Ambiguous Legal Status of the Alibaba VIE
While the VIE structure has been used to avoid the PRC's FDI restrictions for
over a decade, experts and observes have called it the "single biggest time bomb"
in the U.S. market."' There are two types of legal risks inherent in the Alibaba
VIE structure and limited legal recourse available to foreign investors.l1 2 The
two legal risks investors face in the Alibaba VIE are the validity of the corporate
structure and the validity of the contracts that are the foundation of the VIE
structure.' 13
While the VIE structure may eventually be declared valid, legal and enforcea-
ble by the PRC government, the currently presumed validity of the Alibaba VIE
structure could prove contrived and U.S. investors' funds could become worth-
105 Id. (according to a study by law firm Proskauer Rose LLP).
106 De La Merced, supra note 100.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1II Millman, supra note 46.
112 See generally Stan Abrams, The VIE Meta-Narrative: Illegal vs. Invalid, CHINA HEARSAY (Oct.
13, 2011), http://www.chinahearsay.com/the-vie-meta-narrative (distinguishing the concept of the VIE
investment structure being declared illegal and that of particular VIE contracts being unenforceable); see
also J. Gray Sasser, China Risk Factor Hiding in Plain View: A Brief Analysis of Variable Interest
Entities (VIEs) Under Chinese Law, TENN. CORP. NEwst. (Nov. 2012), available at http://www.frost-
browntodd.com/resources-1527.html (discussing the regulatory risk of the PRC government's outlawing
the structure and the operational risk of bifurcating ownership and control).
113 Steven M. Davidoff, Fraud Heightens Jeopardy of Investing in Chinese Companies, NEW YORK
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/fraud-heightens-jeopardy-of-investing-
in- chinese-companies (noting the two ways a VIE investment could go wrong).
260 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 12, Issue 2
Alibaba's Regulatory Work-Around to China's Foreign Investment Restrictions
less.l 14 Experts have argued that the Chinese government is hesitant to make a
definitive statement on the legality of the VIE structure as it continues to the
benefit China's economy.' 1 5 However, recent PRC regulatory actions on both the
local and national level support the argument that a general nullification of the
VIE structure is gradually more likely.' 1 6
At the local government level, certain provincial authorities have banned the
creation of new VIEs. In March 2011, local authorities banned a company, Bud-
dha Steel, from forming a VIE with a local steel plant, stating that the structure
disobeyed current Chinese management policies related to foreign invested enter-
prises and went against public policy.1 17 This ban implies that the VIE structure
is of great concern to China's public policy and sheds light on future rulings on
the legality of the structure.
At the national level, recent legal and regulatory decisions indicated VIE con-
tacts might come under scrutiny if the Chinese government so chooses.' 18 In
2013, the Supreme People's Court, the PRC's top judicial body, ruled that con-
tractual agreements under consideration in the Chinachem case, similar in effect
to VIE structures, to be illegal.11 9 The court determined that the contractual
agreements set up between Chinachem, a Hong Kong business, and China Min-
sheng Banking Corp., a PRC-domiciled company were clearly intended to cir-
cumvent Chinese regulations and were actions based on illegal intentions.1 2 0 The
ruling was an indication that complicated investment schemes will not be
respected if they are structured to evade the clear intentions of Chinese law.121
The court's ruling was the latest indication that China's long assumed tolerance
of overseas capital finding its way into the economy's restricted sectors may be
waning.1 2 2 While the contracts in this particular situation were fundamentally
different, the Court's holding raises the possibility of Chinese courts taking a
similar position in Alibaba's VIE structure.1 23
114 John Ford, No One Who Bought Alibaba Stock Actually Owns Alibaba, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 24,
2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/no-one-who-bought-alibaba-stock-actually-owns-alibaba/.
115 Daniel Goodman, Is China Really About To Clamp Down On The Corporate Structure Used For
Big American IPOs?, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/will-china-
really-clamp-down-on-vies-2011-9 (discussing how the PRC government has largely ignored the use of
VIEs because it was either not aware, didn't care, or found the activity useful at the time).
116 Robert Lewis, China Watch: A Foreign Lawyer's View from the Inside, LAWYER (Oct. 19, 2011),
http://www.thelawyer.com/china-watch-a-foreign-lawyers-view-from-the-inside/lO09862.article ("The
elephant in the room is that the relevant regulators could step back, look at the structure in the entirety,
collapse it down to its essentials and declare it to be in violation of the applicable foreign investment
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117 Thomas M. Shoesmith, PRC Challenge to Variable Interest Entity Structures?, PILLSBURY 2 (Mar.
31, 2011), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/ChinaAlertPRCChallenge toVIEStruc-
tures_03_31_1 Ipdf.pdf.
118 Id.
ll9 Chang, supra note 72.
120 Gough, supra note 5.
I21 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
Volume 12, Issue 2 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 261
Alibaba's Regulatory Work-Around to China's Foreign Investment Restrictions
Furthermore, arbitration rulings in Shanghai on VIE structures have come to
the same result.1 24 Since 2010, Shanghai's arbitration board has invalidated two
variable interest entities that foreign companies initially adopted to control PRC-
domiciled businesses.1 2 5 One case involved an online game company in which
the arbitration panel applied China's contract law to reach the same conclusion as
the Supreme Court in the Chinachem case, stating that the VIEs were illegally
and intentionally "concealing with a lawful form."' 2 6 The PRC government is
starting to attack the VIE structures and the other ways that people have used
legal form to get around the substance of what Chinese law says you can't do.1 2 7
China's civil law system gives the court's decision no binding legal precedent;
however, these rulings are still symbolically significant for the foreign investors
and the future of Alibaba.1 28
B. Proposed Foreign Investment Law
Recently, China took significant steps toward addressing the ambiguity sur-
rounding the VIE structure. On January 19, 2015, MOFCOM published a draft of
Foreign Investment Law ("FIL") for public comments.1 2 9 The proposed law will
govern all foreign investment activity in China, which includes entities controlled
by foreign investors via contractual relationships.1 3 0 Thus, VIE entities are in-
cluded within the FIL scope.' 3 ' The proposed FIL will tighten the administration
of contractual arrangement between foreign investors and the PRC domiciled
VIE entities.1 3 2 When the new law becomes effective, ninety-five companies
currently listed in the U.S. with VIE structures, including Alibaba, could face
legal challenges. '
The draft FIL redefines "foreign investment" as any form of arrangement that
exerts foreign "actual control" over the PRC domiciled business.1 34 Therefore, if
the PRC government determines that "actual control" of a company is in foreign
124 Id.
125 Gough, supra note 5.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Gough, supra note 5; see also Christopher Beddor, The Alibaba IPO and How Chinese Companies
Bypass Foreign Investment Decisions, CKGSB KNOWLEGE (Sept. 1, 2014), available at http://knowl-
edge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2014/09/01 /china/the-alibaba-ipo-and-how-chinese-companies-bypass-foreign-invest-
ment-restrictions/.
129 Elvin C. Ouyang, China Redefines Its Foreign Investment Law, GLOBAL RISK INSIGHTS (Feb. 15,
2015), http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/02/china-redefining-foreign-investment-laws/.
130 Woon-Wah Siu, Jenny Sheng, & David A. Livdahl, China Issues Draft Foreign Investment Law,
PILLSBURY 1-2 (Feb. 12, 2015), available at http://www.pillsburylaw.conVsiteFiles/Publications/AlertFeb
2015ChinaChinalssuesDraftForeigninvestmentLaw.pdf.
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132 Siu, supra note 130, at 4.
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hands, then the VIE contractual control will be recategorized as "foreign invest-
ment" and governed by the newly proposed law.1 3 5 Consequently, for companies
that can prove the VIE is in "actual control" under Chinese legal persons, the
proposed law suggests legal recognition of the contractual control in VIEs. 136
This new change will bring peace of mind to foreign investors because regulatory
risks associated with VIEs may be significantly reduced as a result of legal
recognition. 137
There is, however, slight hesitation on how FIL should deal with existing VIE
entities.' 3 8 A handful of suggestions are pending public comment.1 39 In accor-
dance with notes in the FIL draft, the legislatures will likely take one of the
following suggested approaches: (i) An existing VIE entity can continue its oper-
ation as long as it files a statement of de facto control by Chinese investors with
the Approving Authority after the Foreign Investment Law takes effect; (ii) an
existing VIE can continue its operation only it if is acknowledged by the Approv-
ing Authority to be under de facto control by Chinese investors, or (iii) an ex-
isting VIE entity can continue its operation only if the foreign investors obtain
approval from the Approving Authority after the Foreign Investment Law takes
effect.1 4 0
If the legislature elects to move forward with suggestion (ii) or (iii), which
requires either absolute de facto control by Chinese investors or foreign investor
approval from Approving Authority, companies currently utilizing the VIE struc-
ture, like Alibaba, will essentially be inhibited and China's growing Internet in-
dustry will suffer as a result.141 Alternatively, the Chinese economy could benefit
from approving suggestion (i) or by implementing a middle-ground option that
allows for a three to five year grace period for VIE entities to restructure their
business models.1 42
Substantial uncertainties exist with regards to how the proposed law may im-
pact foreign investments in China, corporate structures, corporate governance
and business operations of PRC-domiciled companies. 143 The proposed FL is an
ambitious undertaking, and once enacted, the law will radically change the for-
eign investment landscape of China.144
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See id.
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140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
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V. Suggestions Moving Forward to Mitigate Risk
While the status of the validity and legality of Alibaba's VIE structure still
remains uncertain, the issue must be addressed. The Chinese economy will con-
tinue to grow at a rapid rate and China's Internet and technology sectors will
become a substantial factor in the global economy. If the validity of foreign in-
vestment in the Internet and technology sectors remains questionable, it can de-
velop into a larger problem for either side: the Chinese economy or U.S. foreign
investors. If the PRC government moves forward to approve FIL, and ultimately
rules the contractual relationships invalid or the structure entirely illegal, this
could potentially result in a massive loss of U.S. investor funds. For those com-
panies that have already adopted the VIE structure, their current business struc-
ture would presumably dissolve, and company ownership would remain with the
Chinese partners, leaving the contractual agreements connecting U.S. investors to
economic benefits in limbo or non-existent. This outcome could significantly im-
pact the Chinese economy, as it would deter foreign investors from contributing
financial capital to two of China's largest economic sectors, Internet and
technology.
Despite the risks discussed, VIEs are the only current reasonable mechanism
to bring foreign investment into China's Internet sector. 145 Likewise, it is not the
VIEs themselves that are the true source of the problem, but instead the PRC
government policies and legal system.1 46 The regulatory policies and rudimen-
tary legal system hinder potential economic growth within China, and are the
root cause of the risk foreign investors face when subsidizing Chinese Internet
companies.1 4 7 The U.S. must engage China to remedy the fundamental problems
pertaining to the validity and legality of the VIE structure.1 4 8
In response to the proposed FIL, companies and foreign investors must moni-
tor the legislation process closely in order to mitigate regulatory risks that will
result from FL.1 4 9 In the meantime, it is recommended that companies begin to
examine and adjust their management structure, and prepare documentation to
prove "actual control" by Chinese investors.15 0
In comparison, the U.S. has a global competitive advantage in services, espe-
cially in information and communication technology ("ITC") and digitally-dis-
tributable services. '5 According to a U.S. Department of Commerce study in
2011, ITC made up over 60% of U.S. service exports and 17% of overall exports,
with demand stemming from European and East Asian markets.1 52 Yet U.S. ex-
ports to China in the ITC sector have remained extremely low. In 2012, less than
145 COMMISSION STAFF REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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3% of U.S. exports in digital services were bound for China.153 This trade imbal-
ance is in large part due to China's restriction on the free flow of information
over the Internet.1 5 4 Moreover, the PRC government requires that Internet com-
panies' ownership majority remain with Chinese nationals, and that the company
itself is domiciled in China. 5 5 These restrictions are in large part the reason VIEs
exist so companies can list on the U.S. exchanges.1 56 Eliminating these restric-
tions would reduce a Chinese company's need to establish a VIE.' 5 7
Furthermore, China's restricted financial markets make it difficult for Chinese
firms to obtain necessary capital domestically.1 5 8 As a result, Chinese Internet
companies looking to expand and raise funds have little choice but to use the VIE
structure to obtain foreign capital.' 5 9 China's restricted financial markets not only
create unnecessary risk for investors by driving Chinese companies to adopt the
VIE structure, but it also limit the potential growth of Chinese Internet compa-
nies that could more efficiently access capital by listing domestically.1 6 0 By loos-
ening financial markets, China would make more domestic capital available,
reducing the need for China's Internet companies to utilize the VIE structure.1 6 1
As discussed, China's legal system remains underdeveloped and often times
corrupt under the rule of the CCP.1 6 2 VIEs are inherently risky because the legal
contract which are the foundation of the VIE structure are only determined bind-
ing and enforceable under Chinese law.1 6 3 Foreign investors have difficulty seek-
ing remedy for any grievance in the Chinese judicial system. '1 China taking
action to improve its legal system and rule of law would give investors relief
knowing that they would be able to fairly file complaints through the Chinese
legal system.1 6 5
While China's regulatory policy and its supporting government agencies have
implied the VIE structure to be illegal in China, the Chinese government in prac-
tice has allowed the VIE structure to endure. 166 The current legal ambiguity of
the VIE structure continues inherent risks born unto foreign investors contribut-
ing financial capital to companies who have previously adopted the structure.1 67
Future clarification from the Chinese government regarding the legal status of the
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VIE structure via FIL will significantly impact the foreign investment landscape
in China.
VI. Conclusion
The VIE structure today remains a risky investment for U.S. investors and a
precarious work-around tool for Chinese companies such as Alibaba. At this
juncture, the VIE is the only viable tool for China's Internet and technology
companies to raise sufficient financial capital in order to remain a competitive
player in the global economy. For that reason, it is suspect that China would not
declare the VIE structure illegal in its entirety, as it continues to contribute to and
benefit its overall economy. However, the newly proposed law may suggest oth-
erwise. FIL has the power to paralyze the VIE structure as it exists today, and
many Chinese Internet companies, like Alibaba, that have gained traction in the
fastest growing e-commerce market in the world will experience future ramifica-
tions as China's Foreign Investment Law materializes.
As VIEs continue to play a key feature of China's growing economy, the PRC
must address the fundamental problems that directly impact the existence and
continuation of the VIE structure. In turn, the U.S. and the SEC should instigate a
more thorough disclosure of the risks involved when investing in a VIE to prop-
erly educate and inform the U.S. investors and general public. Alibaba and their
foreign investors remain secure for the time being, but the Chinese government,
VIE entities, and foreign investors must promptly take action before the VIE
"time-bomb" runs out of time.
266 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 12, Issue 2
